In the wise words of Katt Williams, a Chrysler 300 looks like a Rolls Royce Phantom until a Phantom pulls up.
The Memphis Grizzlies have all of the trappings of a contender. They have a big three of Ja Morant, Jaren Jackson Jr. and Desmond Bane. They consistently develop inexpensive depth as well as almost any team in the NBA. Before this season, they’d established a pretty strong track record of outperforming expectations in the regular season. The Grizzlies look like a contender … until a real contender shows up.
From Feb. 8 on, the Grizzlies played 14 games against teams that finished in the top six in either conference. They went 1-13 in those games. Their point-differential in those games was a miserable minus-126. They tried to fix that in March by firing head coach Taylor Jenkins and assistant Noah LaRoche.
Obviously, that didn’t work in the playoffs.
The Thunder swept the Grizzlies out of the first round. They won the first two games by 70 combined points. They overcame a 29-point deficit to win Game 3 after Morant left with an injury. They sealed the deal on the road Saturday in Game 4. Memphis fought admirably in its two home games, but Oklahoma City’s status in the series as a whole was never really in doubt. It might’ve taken a fifth game, but the Grizzlies were never a real threat to the Thunder.
As unfair as it might seem to judge anyone against the 68-win Thunder, they’re the standard right now, and they’re not going away. Competing in the West at the moment means competing with the Thunder, and what we’ve learned over the past week is that the Grizzlies aren’t in their class — or all that close to it. Injuries matter here, of course. Brandon Clarke and Jaylen Wells would’ve helped. Losing Morant likely swung Game 3. But the roster gap was much, much bigger than that.
Perhaps coaching stability makes a difference, but after the year they just had, it’s not clear what sort of coach they even need. Even If Taylor Jenkins lasted into March, the Grizzlies already tried a drastic, schematic overhaul. LaRoche’s offense, with very little pick-and-roll, was mostly working. Before that stretch of losses to contenders started on Feb. 8, they ranked fifth in offense. They were ready to scrap it six weeks later.
That couldn’t have just been doubt in the system. That’s organizational and perhaps roster-based inertia. People in that building didn’t want the extreme change LaRoche brought. It’s not clear that they’re going to want the sort of schematic change that any new coach would want.
But if their drubbing at the hands of the Thunder showed anything, it’s that some substantive change is absolutely needed.
That’s going to require some self-reflection from Memphis, and that’s something they’ve thankfully proven capable of. If nothing else, their midseason coaching change showed decisiveness that most teams lack. Even if there was resistance to change in the scheme, there’s a willingness at the absolute top of the organization to take risks. Memphis tried a few big swings to do so already. They were linked to both Jimmy Butler and Kevin Durant at the trade deadline. Butler has obviously found a different home. Durant is still on the table.
The Durant fit is obvious. The two things he lacked in Phoenix were a teammate who could generate rim-pressure and a teammate who could anchor a defense. That sounds like Morant and Jackson to me. Durant slides easily between them as a half-court shot-maker that could close tight playoff games and balance the offense as a whole.
Two years ago, trading a haul for a 37-year-old would have been a nonstarter. The long runway Memphis had seemingly built up in 2021 and 2022 has now been spent. They aren’t a plucky young team anymore. It might not be “now or never,” but it’s at least “soon or probably not.” Timeline pickiness isn’t a luxury this team can afford anymore. In two years, Jackson will be on a max or super-max contract and many of the cheap role players will either be extended at market-rate or gone.
This group’s championship equity, right now, is minimal. Yet it might also be at its highest point. Do you trust Morant to be healthy and available in two years?
A Durant trade probably opens the window briefly, which is better than never at all. It also almost certainly breaks up the core. The Grizzlies cap-dumped Marcus Smart at the trade deadline in part to facilitate a Jackson extension. The downside of doing so is that it left the Grizzlies precariously thin on matching salary. Outside of Jackson, Morant and Bane, the highest-paid Grizzly is Clarke at $12.5 million. Durant makes $54.7 million. The money just isn’t plausible without including one of the big three. Bane, based on basketball fit and cap number, probably makes the most sense.
Of course, this might be out of their hands. Durant has leverage by virtue of his expiring contract. By all accounts, Butler was not interested in Memphis. The early reporting on the Durant front hasn’t included the Grizzlies. The sort of splashy, star addition Zach Kleiman sought in February may not be available to Memphis in July. And if that’s the case, it’s worth wondering whether the Grizzlies should take a step back, or at least make a lateral move, to shake up this core.
The NBA’s current cap environment isn’t friendly to traditional “big threes.” Paying depth has never been harder. Retaining it has become a challenge even if it’s supporting the right big three, and it’s not clear that the Grizzlies even have that.
The trio of Jackson, Morant and Bane have four All-Star selections and one All-NBA selection. Morant’s seventh-place MVP finish is the high-point for this group’s star power. There isn’t an unquestioned top-15 player in this group. When you factor in the health risks associated with Morant and Jackson, they’re probably something like, say, the 18th, 22nd and 35th best players in the NBA? That’s a pretty precarious core to bring into a matchup with a Thunder team that might have three All-NBA players for the next half-decade and could have even more All-Defense picks.
If Jackson extends this summer, they’re paying three players superstar money when it’s not clear that any of them warrant it on the playoff stage. Jackson doesn’t rebound and struggles to avoid foul trouble. Even when healthy, Morant’s jumper has never really improved. That makes him somewhat one-dimensional, dependent on athleticism that has likely peaked and may even be starting to fade slightly. Bane is paid to score and he’s never ranked higher than 24th on a single-season per-game scoring leaderboard. These are all players that would probably be appealing to other teams in other circumstances. Together, it’s fair to wonder if they’ve hit their ceiling.
Bane would probably be the easiest to trade. He’s locked up for four more years and he’s pretty schematically flexible on offense. Shooting travels. He’s high-enough usage to lead some lineups but scales easily into a smaller role when needed. Pick a shooting-needy team and he makes sense. Washington’s youngsters would love to have Bane creating shots for them. He could singlehandedly fix the Magic. The Pistons probably can’t rely on another historic Malik Beasley shooting season, but Bane slides right in as a long-term upgrade. He’s not a hard player to trade. He’s also, probably, the easiest player for Memphis to replace.
Jackson is definitional to the Memphis defense. Morant is their offensive upside. The two of them, if perhaps not as consistent as the Grizzlies would like, are at least plausible All-NBA candidates. Bane is not. It’s easier to find a No. 3 option than it is to find what Jackson is today and what Morant was two years ago (and could hopefully one day be again). A Bane deal could be more of a reset than a rebuild. Restock the asset cupboard. Clean up the books. See how you do and re-evaluate in 2026.
Moving Jackson or Morant, for a multitude of reasons, would be more complicated. Jackson is an impending free agent, and an extremely high-leverage one at that. All he has to do to scare off a suitor is tell them “I’m signing with the Lakers in 2026.” It worked for Anthony Davis, and until the Lakers either get a big man or make big enough long-term financial commitments elsewhere to take them out of 2026 cap space, they’re going to be a pretty effective boogeyman here. His preference, in all likelihood, would be to extend in Memphis. If he’s super max eligible, he takes it. Jackson was pretty severely underpaid on this contract. He’s going to care about maximizing his value on the next one.
Things get trickier if he isn’t super max eligible. His current cap number is so low that a 40% raise using standard veteran extension rules doesn’t get him to fair value. The Grizzlies anticipated this and traded Smart to clear cap space. That opens the door to a renegotiation-and-extension similar to the one Lauri Markkanen signed last offseason. Memphis has bigger financial commitments elsewhere than Utah does. Until Memphis gets to Jackson’s max, an extension probably isn’t assured.
Yet a trade anywhere besides a preferred destination for Jackson probably isn’t on the table. Nobody is renting him for a price the Grizzlies would or should accept, and nobody should trade for him without an extension reasonably assured. A new team wouldn’t have the super-max bullet to use in those talks. Most wouldn’t have cap space either, and might need to wait until next summer to use Bird Rights to keep him. Basically, it’s “keep Jackson or trade him somewhere he wants to be.”
Morant has the opposite problem. It’s not clear how many teams would even want him. Put aside the injuries and put aside the off-court stuff for a moment. How many teams are eager to trade for a high-usage guard that can’t shoot 3s in 2025? Someone would do it. Elite guard penetration is a pillar on which an offense can be built, provided proper spacing and secondary shot-making, particularly late in games, still exists. But Morant isn’t inspiring a bidding war anymore. More likely, he’s the sort of player that gets traded for another team’s problem. Turning Morant into, say, Trae Young or Jamal Murray probably doesn’t accomplish all that much.
Do you know many drivers who have traded their 300 in for a phantom?
You’d probably need to win the lottery to do so. This is the one area in which the Grizzlies have struggled from a player-development standpoint. Give them a scrappy G-Leaguer like Scotty Pippen Jr. or Vince Williams and they’ll turn him into a rotation player in their sleep. The bigger bets have gone bust. If they draft Trey Murphy over Ziaire Williams they probably don’t have these problems right now. Justise Winslow was a good idea that didn’t pan out. When the Spurs try a one-off tank year they get Tim Duncan or Victor Wembanyama. When the Grizzlies do it they get Zach Edey. Bane was a grand slam at No. 30, but the irony for him is that he wasn’t some high-variance gamble. He fell in the draft because he was old. He is who the basketball world thought he’d be … just a better version of that.
This stuff is hard. Getting it right is expensive. The easy doors have probably already closed. They don’t have a lottery pick incoming. Their kids have mostly grown up and, save Edey, probably don’t have much more raw talent to tap. Right now, the Grizzlies just sort of have a 45-to-50-win team. There’s nothing wrong with having a 45-to-50-win team. It’s just pretty apparent that all you have is a 45-to-50-win team when the 68-win behemoth rolls up.
The Grizzlies seemingly have loftier aspirations than that. That’s why they fired Jenkins and chased Butler and Durant. If they’re going to get there next season, it just isn’t going to be with this core group.
