Americans used to be steadfast in supporting Israel. No longer

I ran from the White House briefing room, past the portico entrance of the West Wing to our camera position on the lawn, and flung on an ear piece connecting me to the studio.

A moment later the presenter asked me about the comments we had just heard live from US President Donald Trump.

I said we were seeing a fundamental shift in a United States’ policy position after decades of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

It was February this year, and Trump had just held talks with Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu – the first foreign leader since Trump’s inauguration to be invited to the White House. The US president vowed that his country would take control of the Gaza Strip, having earlier pledged the territory would also be “cleaned out” and emptied of its Palestinian population.

Trump was grabbing the world’s attention with a proposal that hardened his administration’s support for Israel and also upended international norms, flying in the face of international law. It marked an apex of the current Republican Party’s relationship with Israel – sometimes described as support “at all costs”.

The alliance between the two countries had been thrust into the international spotlight after the Hamas attacks on Israel on 7 October 2023 and Israel’s offensive in Gaza that followed.

During that war, the administration of President Joe Biden sent some $18bn (£13.5bn) worth of weapons to Israel, maintaining unprecedented levels of US backing. The period was marked by intensifying protests in the US, with many of those protesting being traditional Democrat leaning voters. The fallout became the focus of a bitter culture war centring on American attitudes towards Israel and the Palestinians. I covered demonstrations in which protesters repeatedly labelled Biden “Genocide Joe” – an accusation he always rejected.

At the time Donald Trump branded the protesters “radical-left lunatics” and the Trump administration is now targeting for deportation hundreds of foreign students who it accuses of antisemitism or support for Hamas, a move being vigorously challenged in the courts.

But as a Democrat who could otherwise have expected the vote of many of those upset over his support for Israel that support was politically costly for Biden in a way not experienced by previous presidents or, indeed, Trump.

One of Biden’s key decision makers over relations with Israel still wrestles with the decisions they took.

“My first reaction is just, I understand that this has evoked incredibly passionate feelings for Arab Americans, for non-Arab Americans, Jewish Americans,” says Jake Sullivan, Biden’s former national security adviser.

“There were two competing considerations: one was wanting to curb Israel’s excesses, both with respect to civilian casualties and the flow of humanitarian assistance. The other was […] wanting to make sure that we were not cutting Israel off from the capabilities it needed to confront its enemies on multiple different fronts.”

He added: “The United States stood behind Israel materially, morally, and in every other way in those days following October 7th.”

But opinion polls suggest support for Israel among the American public is dwindling.

A Gallup survey taken in March this year found only 46% of Americans expressed support for Israel (the lowest level in 25 years of Gallup’s annual tracking) while 33% now said they sympathised with the Palestinians – the highest ever reading of that measure. Other polls have found similar results.

Surveys – with all their limitations – suggest the swing is largely among Democrats and the young, although not exclusively. Between 2022 and 2025, the Pew Research Center found that the proportion of Republicans who said they had unfavourable views of Israel rose from 27% to 37% (younger Republicans, aged under 49, drove most of that change).

The US has long been Israel’s most powerful ally – ever since May 1948, when America was the first country to recognise the nascent State of Israel. But while US support for Israel is extremely likely to continue long-term, these swings in sentiment raise questions over the practical extent and policy limits of the US’s ironclad backing and whether the shifting sands of public opinion will eventually feed through to Washington, with real-world policy impacts.

To many, the close relationship between the US and Israel seems like a permanent, unshakeable part of the geopolitical infrastructure. But it wasn’t always guaranteed – and at the very beginning largely came down to one man.

In early 1948, US President Harry S Truman had to decide on his approach to Palestine. The country was in the grip of sectarian bloodshed between Jews and Arab Palestinians after three decades of colonial rule by Britain, which had announced its intention to pull out. Truman was deeply moved by the plight of Jewish survivors of the Holocaust stranded in displaced persons camps in Europe.

In New York City, a young Francine Klagsbrun, who would later become an academic and historian of Israeli prime minister Golda Meir, watched her parents praying for a Jewish homeland.

“I grew up in a very Jewish home and a very Zionist home also,” she explains. “So my older brother and I would go out and collect money to try to get England to open the doors. My brother would go on the subway trains, all the doors open on the train and he’d shout ‘open, open, open the doors to Palestine’,” she recalls.

Truman’s administration was deeply divided over whether to back a Jewish state. The CIA and the Department of State cautioned against recognising a Jewish state. They feared a bloody conflict with Arab countries that might draw in the US, risking Cold War escalation with the Soviets.

Two days before Britain was due to pull out of Palestine, an explosive row took place in the Oval Office. Truman’s domestic advisor Clark Clifford argued in favour of recognising a Jewish state. On the other side of the debate was Secretary of State George Marshall, a World War Two general whom Truman viewed as “the greatest living American”.

The man Truman admired so much was vigorously opposed to the president immediately recognising a Jewish state because of his fears about a regional war – and even went as far as telling Truman he would not vote for him in the coming presidential election if he backed recognition.

But despite the moment of extraordinary tension, Truman immediately recognised the State of Israel when it was declared two days later by David Ben-Gurion, the country’s first prime minister.

The historian Rashid Khalidi, a New York-born Palestinian whose family members were expelled from Jerusalem by the British in the 1930s, says the US and Israel were fused together in part by shared cultural connections. From 1948 onwards, he says, the Palestinians had a critical diplomatic disadvantage in the US, with their claim to national self-determination sidelined in an unequal contest.

“On the one side, you had the Zionist movement led by people whom are European and American by origin… The Arabs had nothing similar,” he says. “[The Arabs] weren’t familiar with the societies, the cultures, the political leaderships of the countries that decided the fate of Palestine. How could you speak to American public opinion if you had no idea what America is like?” says Khalidi.

Popular culture played its role too – notably the 1958 novel and subsequent blockbuster film Exodus by the author Leon Uris. It retold the story of Israel’s establishment to mass audiences of the 1960s, the movie version creating a heavily Americanised portrayal of pioneers in a new land.

Ehud Olmert, who at the time was a political activist but would later become Israeli prime minister, points to the war of 1967 as the moment when America’s support for Israel became the profound alliance that it is today.

That was the war in which Israel, after weeks of escalating fears of invasion by its neighbours, defeated the Arab countries in six days, effectively tripling the size of its territory, and launching its military occupation over (at that time) more than a million stateless Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.

“For the first time, the United States understood the importance and the significance of Israel as a major military and political power in the Middle East, and since then everything has changed in the basic relations within our two countries,” he says.

Over the years, Israel became the biggest recipient of US foreign military aid on Earth. Strong American diplomatic support, particularly at the United Nations, has been a key element of the alliance; while successive US presidents have also sought to broker peace between Israel and its Arab neighbours.

But in recent years it has been far from a straightforward relationship.

When I spoke to Jake Sullivan, I put to him the issue of Arab Americans in the state of Michigan who boycotted Biden and his successor candidate Kamala Harris over the extent of their support for Israel during the Gaza conflict, voting instead for Trump. He rejected the idea that Biden lost the state because of this support.

But that backing still prompted a marked backlash within a section of the American public.

A Pew Research Center survey taken in March this year found that 53% of Americans expressed an unfavourable opinion of Israel, an 11 point increase since the last time the survey was taken in 2022.

Currently, these shifts in public opinion haven’t yet prompted a major change in US foreign policy. Whilst some ordinary US voters are turning away from Israel, on Capitol Hill elected politicians from both parties are still mostly keen to talk up the importance of a strong alliance with Israel.

Some think that a sustained, long-term shift in public opinion might eventually lead to reduced real-world support for the country – with weaker diplomatic ties and reduced military aid. This issue is felt particularly sharply by some inside Israel. Several months before 7 October, the former Israeli general and head of the Military Intelligence Directorate, Tamir Hayman, warned of cracks forming between his country and the United States, in part because of what he described as the slow movement of American Jews away from Zionism.

Israel’s political shift in favour of the national-religious right has played a key part in this. From early 2023, Israel was gripped by an unprecedented wave of protests among Jewish Israelis against Netanyahu’s judicial reforms, with many arguing he was moving the country towards theocracy – a claim he always rejected. Some in the US who had always felt a deep sense of connection with Israel were watching with growing concern.

In March this year, the Institute for National Security Studies, a leading Tel Aviv-based think tank led by Hayman, published a paper arguing that US public opinion had entered the “danger zone”, as far as support for Israel was concerned. “The dangers of diminished US support, particularly as it reflects long-term and deeply rooted trends, cannot be overstated,” wrote the paper’s author, Theodore Sasson. “Israel needs the support of the global superpower for the foreseeable future,”.

That support at the policy level has only strengthened over the decades, but it is important to note that historic American opinion polling shows public opinion has ebbed and flowed before.

Today, Dennis Ross, who helped negotiate the Oslo accords with President Bill Clinton, says American opinion on Israel has become increasingly tied to sharp political divisions in the US.

“Trump is viewed very negatively by most Democrats – the latest polls show over 90 percent,” Ross says. “There’s potential for Trumpian support for Israel to feed a dynamic here that, at least among Democrats, increases criticism of Israel.”

But he expects that Washington’s support for Israel – in the form of military aid and diplomatic ties – will continue. And he thinks if Israeli voters eject their prime minister and replace him with a more centrist government, one that may reverse some of the disquiet in the US. A general election must be held in Israel before late October next year.

Under such a new Israeli government, Ross argues, “there won’t be the same impulse towards creating de-facto annexation of the West Bank. There’ll be much more outreach to the Democratic Party and the Democratic Party officials.”

Those who see a fraying relationship are paying particularly close attention to the views of younger Americans – a group that has shown the most marked shift in opinion since 7 October. As the ‘TikTok generation’, many young Americans get their news about the war from social media and the high civilian death toll from Israel’s offensive in Gaza appears to have driven the declining support among young Democrats and liberals in America. Last year, 33 percent of Americans under 30 said their sympathies lie entirely or mostly with the Palestinian people, versus 14 percent who said the same about Israelis, according to a Pew Research poll published last month. Older Americans were more likely to sympathise with the Israelis.

Karin Von Hippel, chair of the Arden Defence and Security Practice and a former official in the US State Department, agrees there is a demographic divide among Americans on the topic of Israel – one that even extends to Congress.

“Younger Congress men and women are less knee jerk, reactively supporting Israel,” she says. “And I think younger Americans, including Jewish Americans, are less supportive of Israel than their parents were.”

But she is sceptical of the idea that this might lead to a serious change at the policy level. Despite changing opinions among the party’s base, she says, many of the most prominent Democrats who might run for President in 2028 are “classically supportive of Israel”. She names Gretchen Whitmer, the governor of Michigan, and Pete Buttigieg, the former Transportation Secretary, as examples. And what about Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, the Instagram-famous congresswoman who is a long-standing supporter of Palestinian rights? Hippel responds bluntly: “I don’t think an Ocasio-Cortez type can win right now.”

In the weeks after February’s Trump-Netanyahu press conference at the White House, I asked Jake Sullivan where he thought the US-Israel relationship was going. He argued that both countries were dealing with internal threats to their democratic institutions that would define their character and their relationship.

“I think it’s almost less of a foreign policy question than it is a domestic policy question in these two countries – whither America and whither Israel?” he says. “The answer to those two questions will tell you where does the US-Israel relationship go five, ten, fifteen years from now.”

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